UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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S/1995/272
7 April 1995
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 7 APRIL 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Acting upon instructions from my Government and further to my letter dated 28 March 1995, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of a letter dated 6 April 1995 addressed to you by Mr. Mohammed Said Al-Sahaf, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, concerning acts of aggression and violation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and airspace of Iraq committed on the pretext of pursuing elements that were threatening the security of Turkey.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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ANNEX

Letter dated 7 April 1995 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the President of the Security Council

Further to my letter dated 28 March 1995, I have the honour to inform you that the invasion of the territory of the Republic of Iraq by Turkish forces continues, in violation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and airspace of Iraq; on the pretext of pursuing elements that threaten its security, Turkey is thus taking advantage of the difficult situation that prevails in northern Iraq. This situation was created by the United States of America and the United Kingdom, in violation not only of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the fundamental principles of international law, but also of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

In this connection, I should like to inform you that the number of Turkish combat incursions into Iraqi territory carried out by aircraft and helicopters has increased. As shown in the appended table, the Turkish air force carried out 107 sorties, between 20 and 31 March 1995.

The Government of the Republic of Iraq categorically rejects the Turkish allegations and condemns this invasion which constitutes a flagrant and grave violation of the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of Iraq. Despite the prerogatives accorded to it by the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council has done nothing to react to the Turkish invasion by issuing a condemnation, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter and the rules of international law.

In view of the violation of the sovereignty, political independence, security and territorial integrity of Iraq, the Security Council finds itself once again having to face up to its responsibilities.

Notwithstanding the excuses it has made, the Turkish Government, which has deployed its forces in order to invade Iraqi territory, bears full responsibility for this action, particularly since Iraq, contrary to the allegations of the Turkish Government, is in no way responsible for this situation; the latter is, in fact, a consequence of United States policy of interference in the affairs of the region and of the deployment of United States and British forces on Turkish territory, in order to intervene militarily in northern Iraq and to prevent the latter from exercising its national sovereignty over that region. Indeed, if Iraq had been able to exercise its authority in the northern part of the country, the Kurdish armed terrorist cliques and armed bands would not have been able to establish themselves in northern Iraq and in southern Turkey. The appearance of these terrorist armed bands is a result of the American policy of interference in northern Iraq which, should it continue, would result in an even greater threat to the region's security and stability; these are already seriously compromised.

I should be grateful if you would draw the attention of members of the Security Council to this letter and if you would have the text circulated as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Mohammed Said AL-SAHAF
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Iraq

Enclosure

Statement of violations of airspace and shelling of Iraqi territory (number of sorties) by Turkish combat aircraft and helicopters

Date	Time	Number of sorties	Type of aircraft	Zones situated within the Republic of Iraq
20 March 1995	0800-1800	35	Combat aircraft	Irbil Rawanduz North of Dukan
21 March 1995	0800-1825	14	Combat aircraft	Zakho Amadiya Chirwan
22 March 1995	0822-1825	13	Combat aircraft	Amadiya Mirkah Sur Chirwan Biban
22 March 1995	0822-1825	12	Combat helicopters	Amadiya Mirkah Sur Chirwan Biban
23 March 1995	0917-1350	6	Combat aircraft	Zakho Amadiya Siakan Bibsan Batufah
23 March 1995	0917-1350	3	Combat helicopters	Zakho Amadiya Siakan Bibsan Batufah

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Date	Time	Number of sorties	Type of aircraft	Zones situated within the Republic of Iraq
24 March 1995	1430-1450	11 formations	Formations of 7 combat aircraft each	Zakho Dohuk Amadiya
27 March 1995	1135-1340	6	Combat aircraft	Zakho Amadiya
30 March 1995	1120-1750	4	Combat helicopters	Zakho Batufah
31 March 1995	0805-1020	3	Combat helicopters	Zakho Batufah

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LETTER DATED 6 APRIL 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith a table showing the numbers of bombs, missiles and other matériel left behind by the 30-Power aggression against Iraq and found and disposed of in all parts of the country between 1 and 31 March 1995. The total was 1,775 bombs, grenades, missiles and mines of various types.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex

Monthly status of bomb disposal during the period
1 to 31 March 1995

Governorate	Classification of ordnance
1. Baghdad	2 120-mm mortar shells 1 Russian-manufactured anti-personnel mine 1 82-mm mortar shell 1 Russian-manufactured 57-mm grenade
2. Qadisiya	4 cluster bombs
3. Dhi Qar	930 mortar shells
4.	10 120-mm shells
5. Anbar	6 United States-manufactured bombs 1 anti-tank rocket 1 2-kg sack of gunpowder
6. Maysan	1 cluster bomb 3 anti-tank mines 3 rockets 14 Strella projectiles
7. Muthanna	90 spherical bombs 2 82-mm mortar shells
8. Karbala	1 anti-armour missile 1 mortar shell
9. Ta'mim	4 mortar shells 1 130-mm artillery gun
10. Basra	78 cluster bombs 18 spherical bombs 196 spindle bombs 81 60-mm mortar shells 15 82-mm mortar shells 15 120-mm mortar shells 150 anti-tank mines 3 Faz missiles 1 anti-personnel shell 63 Towtow missiles 11 rockets 38 57-mm launches 1 37-mm artillery rocket 2 attack hand grenades 25 20-mm bomb detonators 27 100-mm projectiles 25 rocket detonators

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SECOND PROGRESS REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION (UNAVEM III)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 976 (1995) of 8 February 1995, in which the Council requested me to inform it monthly of progress in the deployment of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) and in the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol (S/1994/1411, annex), including the maintenance of an effective cease-fire, free access by UNAVEM III to all areas of Angola, free flow of humanitarian assistance throughout the country and compliance by both the Government and by the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) with their obligations under the Lusaka Protocol. It covers the main developments since my last report, dated 5 March (S/1995/177).

II. POLITICAL SITUATION

2. During the period under review, my Special Representative, Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, continued his efforts to help to improve the political climate in the country and to facilitate the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. At the same time, the Joint Commission continued to monitor major political, military and humanitarian developments relating to implementation of the Protocol. To date, the Commission has held 12 regular and 4 extraordinary sessions under the chairmanship of my Special Representative.

3. On 12 March, during the World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen, I received the Minister of External Affairs of Angola and underscored my concern over the slow pace of the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. I stressed that that concern was shared by the members of the Security Council. On 16 March, following my return to Headquarters, I briefed the Council about developments relating to Angola.

4. In late February 1995, the allegations made by Colonel "Zavarra", a UNITA defector, that UNITA was preparing for a major military offensive, contributed to increased tension. In an effort to defuse the situation, my Special Representative held a number of consultations with senior officials from the

Government and UNITA. On 8 March 1995, he travelled to Bailundo to meet with Mr. Jonas Savimbi, President of UNITA. The following day, he met with the President of Angola, José Eduardo dos Santos, in Luanda.

5. Concerned by the slow pace of implementation and continued cease-fire violations, I decided to dispatch to Angola my Special Adviser, Under-Secretary-General Ismat Kittani, to deliver letters from me to President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi and to discuss with them the measures they must urgently take to bring the military situation under control and ensure respect for the cease-fire. He was also to assess whether the current situation in Angola permitted the deployment of UNAVEM III.

6. Mr. Kittani visited Angola from 17 to 22 March 1995. In addition to President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi, he met with the Prime Minister of Angola, the President of the National Assembly, the heads of the government and UNITA delegations to the Joint Commission, the General Secretary of the Movimento Popular para a Libertaçao de Angola (MPLA), the Ambassadors of the three observer States (Portugal, Russian Federation and United States of America), members of the diplomatic corps and the head of the Catholic Church in Angola. In his discussions with the Government and UNITA, in which my Special Representative also participated, Mr. Kittani conveyed my concerns at the delays in the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol and the need for the parties to cooperate fully with UNAVEM III. He also stressed that members of the Security Council needed convincing evidence that both sides had renounced the military option and were genuinely committed to the peace process.

7. During their meetings with Mr. Kittani, President dos Santos and other senior government officials appealed for the early deployment of all formed units of UNAVEM III. The Government also stated that it was doing its best to create the necessary conditions for such deployment, both materially and in terms of promoting a peaceful climate throughout the country. While expressing doubts about UNITA's commitment to peace, the President and other senior officials reiterated that the Government had renounced the military option. In the meeting held with Mr. Kittani in Bailundo, Mr. Savimbi also expressed his party's commitment to the full implementation of the Lusaka Protocol and said that he was strongly in favour of a speedy deployment of UNAVEM III's infantry units.

8. On the basis of Mr. Kittani's report, I addressed a letter on 25 March to the President of the Security Council (S/1995/230) in which I suggested that, although there were certain risks involved, it would be in the best interest of the peace process to proceed with preparations for the deployment of UNAVEM III's infantry units. This suggestion has been welcomed by the Security Council and by both the Government of Angola and UNITA.

III. MILITARY AND POLICE MATTERS

9. In paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 976 (1995), the Government and UNITA were called upon to implement certain initial tasks set out in the Lusaka Protocol before the deployment of United Nations infantry units to Angola could take place. These tasks included an effective cessation of hostilities

and full disengagement of government and UNITA forces; setting up of verification mechanisms; establishment of reliable communication links among the Government, UNITA and UNAVEM; provision to the United Nations of all relevant military data; and the early start of demining. These requirements were reiterated by the President of the Security Council in his statement of 10 March 1995 (S/PRST/1995/11).

10. During the period under review, the cease-fire in Angola has generally held. In recent weeks, tensions have noticeably decreased in several areas, and UNAVEM III has pursued its efforts to consolidate contacts at various levels with the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) and with UNITA troops. Difficulties experienced in liaising with UNITA in various parts of the country have somewhat decreased, although several local UNITA commanders continue to restrict movement by UNAVEM in areas under their control. There has been some progress in establishing triangular communications among UNAVEM and the two parties, but a great deal remains to be accomplished. While liaison with the Government has been successfully established in all regions, effective communication with UNITA exists only in the regions of Huambo and Uige.

11. Despite occasional incidents, cease-fire violations have remained at a relatively low level. Formal complaints were received from both the Government and UNITA, but not all the reported cases could be verified and confirmed by UNAVEM, since its movements are still restricted by poor road conditions, unidentified mines and other factors. The complaints involved attacks on villages, ambushes, raids, looting, abduction of civilians, mine-laying and other violations. At the same time, unauthorized troop movements, extensive military preparations and heavy air activity have continued. In some instances, tensions still rise dangerously high. On 29 March, a military aircraft attacked a UNITA-controlled airport in Andulo. UNITA troops returned fire with anti-aircraft weapons but no casualties were reported. On 25 March, the UNAVEM team site in Chongoroi (southern region) was subjected to a deliberate and apparently carefully planned attack by unidentified armed military elements. As a result of the attack, two United Nations military observers were slightly injured and the team site was temporarily evacuated. UNAVEM strongly condemned the incident and demanded that the parties take all appropriate action to ensure the safety and security of United Nations personnel. An inquiry is in progress to ascertain the perpetrators of the attack.

12. Progress has been made in the disengagement of troops in the central and northern regions of the country. UNITA forces have finally withdrawn from Uige to Negage in accordance with the agreements reached between the Chiefs of Staff of the Government and UNITA on 10 January in Chipipa and on 2 February in Waku Kungo. However, both parties continue to occupy some forward checkpoints. In Huambo, FAA troops have completed their withdrawal from Bela Vista to Chinguar. The Force Commander of UNAVEM, Major-General Chris Garuba, visited the area on 21 March and, at a meeting presided over by him, the two parties committed themselves to maintaining the disengagement positions. On 29 March, he travelled to Bailundo to discuss with the UNITA high command the modalities for the second phase of disengagement which both parties have agreed to complete by 10 April.

13. In the meantime, the Joint Commission held its twelfth regular session in Luanda on 28 March 1995. It noted with satisfaction that the first phase of the disengagement of forces had been adequately completed. The Commission is now taking measures to ensure that the second phase, which involves Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul and Moxico provinces, will be completed as scheduled.

14. With regard to mechanisms for the verification of the cease-fire, improved access by UNAVEM to UNITA-controlled areas has made it possible to establish 47 of the 52 team sites and the 6 regional headquarters outside Luanda. As of 1 April, the strength of the Mission was 527 military and police personnel. A Joint Commission team has visited 15 of the 21 airports to which UNAVEM needs access for operational purposes and to verify allegations of cease-fire violations. On one occasion, it was denied access to the government airport in Catumbela. UNAVEM expressed its serious concern over this incident. It will be essential for UNAVEM III to have unhindered access to the airport. The timely deployment of UNAVEM III's infantry units will be facilitated only if it has full access to Catumbela airport, which it is actively seeking.

15. The United Nations has made strenuous efforts to accelerate action on mine clearance, which is one of the essential initial tasks set forth in my report of 1 February (S/1995/97), but the mine situation remains critical. UNAVEM has received partial information from FAA and UNITA concerning minefields, as well as confirmation that the parties will make available the necessary mine-clearance personnel. Both sides believe, however, that the United Nations should equip and train the personnel. The Government indicated that it had allocated some funds for the procurement of mine-clearance equipment, but much remains to be done before actual demining can begin. In a recent incident, a vehicle belonging to CONCERN, a non-governmental organization (NGO), detonated an anti-tank mine in the town of Cuito in the eastern region and three passengers were injured.

16. Despite the improved military situation, several logistical obstacles remain to be overcome to create the conditions required for deployment of UNAVEM troops. In my progress report of 5 March (S/1995/177), I informed the Security Council that the Secretariat and my Special Representative were pursuing several pressing issues with the Government of Angola in connection with its contribution to UNAVEM III. These include, in particular, the provision of essential services and access to key facilities (airports, ports, storage, working premises, etc.), air and vehicular transport and the repair of roads, railways and airfields. The Angolan authorities have made some accommodation and transport available to UNAVEM. However, the level of these contributions, including the provision of premises for the Mine Action Training School, remains inadequate and more direct assistance is required. Unless further facilities are provided urgently, it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to deploy UNAVEM III within the demanding time-frame stipulated in my report of 1 February (S/1995/97 and Add.1).

17. Paragraph 13 of resolution 976 (1995) called upon the Government of Angola to conclude an agreement with the United Nations on the status of UNAVEM forces no later than 20 March. On 13 March, a draft was transmitted to the Angolan authorities, who subsequently informed the Secretariat that they needed additional time to study it. Despite several reminders, the Government of

Angola has not yet indicated its readiness to sign the agreement, notwithstanding its declared wish that the UNAVEM III logistic and infantry units be deployed as soon as possible, an objective which will be obstructed if there is further delay in concluding the agreement.

18. As indicated in my letter to the President of the Security Council dated 25 March (S/1995/230), I decided to proceed with preparations for the deployment of United Nations infantry units to Angola, including the early induction of all support troops. However, as a result of the suspension of these preparations during Mr. Kittani's visit to Angola, the process is now 10 to 15 days behind the original schedule. It is therefore expected that the main body of the support units will arrive in the country in the second half of April. In the meantime, some countries that have agreed to contribute infantry battalions have already undertaken reconnaissance missions of planned deployment areas.

IV. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

19. During the past month, overall progress has been made in the humanitarian sphere, in spite of the tension that continued in parts of the country. Relief programmes were launched in areas that had been visited by my Special Representative in February, while new evaluation missions were planned for communities that remained isolated. During the reporting period, access was not denied to any locality where relief activities were under way. Because of logistical constraints and insecure conditions, however, possibilities for transportation by road continued to be severely limited along the three main highways - Luanda/Malange, Benguela/Kuito and Namibe/Menongue - as well as along other routes. This made it difficult to evaluate conditions in rural communities and prevented displaced persons from returning to their areas of origin. Relief activities continued to rely heavily on airlift operations.

20. In spite of these generally favourable developments, several incidents disrupted the humanitarian programme. On 2 March 1995, staff members of an NGO were attacked while en route from Cubal to Benguela (see para. 22 below). On 9 March, following a misunderstanding concerning the nature of the humanitarian operations in the provincial capital of Luena (Moxico), the World Food Programme (WFP) and the NGO "Save the Children Fund-USA" were forced to suspend food shipments to that town. My Special Representative visited Luena on 10 March, accompanied by the Minister of Social Affairs, the Ambassadors of the observer countries, the mission heads of several United Nations agencies and an NGO and was able to resolve the matter. The Humanitarian Coordination Group, in which the Government (through the Ministry of Social Affairs), UNITA, the United Nations Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UCAH), the United Nations agencies and the observer countries participate, has proved to be a useful forum for solving problems of this kind.

21. As the scope of the humanitarian programme expands and access to previously closed areas gradually improves, United Nations agencies and NGOs will be reassessing emergency requirements, especially in the light of the harvest in April. A complete reassessment of food aid and agricultural requirements will be carried out by WFP and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) in April 1995, taking into account the earlier spontaneous

movements of displaced persons towards their areas of origin and more recent movements triggered by security factors.

22. With respect to the comprehensive mine action programme, I should like to point out such positive developments as the establishment by the Government of the National Mine Action Institute, and the resumption of mine-clearance activities by the Mine Advisory Group in Luena. In the meantime, the Central Mine Action Office of UCAH, together with UNAVEM, has begun to collect information on the location of minefields throughout the country. Several NGOs continue to remove mines in the provinces of Bié, Cunene, Kwanza Norte and Malange. However, following the regrettable attack on relief workers of the German NGO Cap Anamur on 2 March 1995, mine-clearance activities are still suspended in Benguela province. I call upon the two parties to support and facilitate all mine-related activities undertaken by the United Nations and NGOs and to comply fully with their own obligations in this domain, as spelled out in the Lusaka Protocol.

23. The demobilization and reintegration process is currently being reviewed in the light of the agreement recently reached on the concept of the global incorporation of UNITA troops into the Angolan Armed Forces prior to any demobilization. UCAH and UNAVEM are finalizing work on the mechanisms for coordinating responsibilities involved in establishing and managing the quartering areas for UNITA troops.

24. While the response from the international community at the donors' conference held in Geneva in late February was positive, the expanding scale of humanitarian programmes has placed a strain on available resources, and speedy action to raise new resources is required. At the same time, both the Government and UNITA must take measures to guarantee the security and inviolability of relief operations throughout the country, including, first and foremost, guarantees of security for humanitarian aid workers. Incidents that threaten or disrupt humanitarian activities can only lead to increased suffering among the civilian population, heightened political tensions and reluctance on the part of the donor community to continue providing needed assistance.

V. OBSERVATIONS

25. Following the statement of the President of the Security Council dated 10 March (S/PRST/1995/11) and the visit to Angola by my Special Adviser, Mr. Kittani, there have been several encouraging developments in the Angolan peace process. After weeks of frustrating delays, the pace of implementation of the Lusaka Protocol has increased. Progress has been made in the consolidation of the cease-fire, disengagement of forces, freedom of movement of UNAVEM, discussion of the modalities for the global incorporation of UNITA troops into the national army and other critical areas.

26. But the progress achieved represents only a beginning and further resolute steps are needed to ensure that the peace process can be pursued with confidence. In my letter of 25 March 1995 (S/1995/230), I informed the Security Council of my intention to proceed with all necessary preparations for the deployment to Angola of the UNAVEM infantry battalions, including the support

units. Arrangements for the dispatch of these units are now under way. Once again, however, I must remind the parties that, unless they comply without delay with the immediate requirements of the Lusaka Protocol and provide UNAVEM with indispensable logistic support, it will not be possible to initiate the deployment of United Nations infantry to Angola in May. For this to happen, the conditions described in paragraph 32 of my report of 1 February, in paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 976 (1995) and in my report of 5 March have to be substantially fulfilled. I shall not hesitate to recommend to the Security Council that the deployment of the United Nations infantry be postponed or stopped if there are serious delays in carrying out the above commitments. Those commitments include the effective cessation of hostilities; full disengagement of government and UNITA forces; provision of relevant military data; designation of quartering areas; setting up of verification mechanisms; and early start of demining. With this in mind, it is my intention to bring in the infantry battalions in stages.

27. The efforts undertaken by the United Nations to assist in implementation of the Lusaka Protocol must be matched by political will and concrete action on the part of the Government and UNITA. More than four months after the signing of the Lusaka Protocol, there are still many causes for serious concern, namely the fragility of the cease-fire, reports of military preparations and major troop movements and indications of the continued acquisition of weapons from abroad. In addition, the recent attacks on unarmed United Nations military and police observers and on NGO personnel raise doubts about the willingness of the parties to cooperate in good faith in implementation of the peace process.

28. In this connection, I must warn against undue expectations that the arrival of United Nations troops will in itself solve the pressing problems that the Angolans must resolve themselves: disengagement of their troops countrywide, establishment of reliable verification mechanisms and communication links, provision to the United Nations of all necessary military data, initiation of the quartering process, release of prisoners, etc. Recent assurances are welcome, but further concrete steps need to be taken by the parties to enhance the credibility of the peace process. It is worth recalling in this connection that the mandate of UNAVEM III is to monitor and verify the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. UNAVEM troops can play a useful role in fostering a climate of mutual trust and confidence but they cannot perform tasks that belong to the Angolan parties themselves.

29. I am increasingly concerned about the failure to provide UNAVEM III with essential services and facilities in Luanda and elsewhere. One of the major problems is the denial of full operational access to Catumbela airport but there are others, such as the unavailability of accommodation, office space and warehouses and the failure to provide fuel at the most preferential rates. Nor have the Government and UNITA begun mine clearance and the repair of major access routes, designation of quartering areas or the preparation of other vital infrastructures, although they carried out these tasks with some success in 1991 after the Bicesse accords. Unless these issues are addressed without delay, the deployment schedule of United Nations troops will be affected and the peace process hindered. The parties will have to bear full responsibility for the resulting delays. It is imperative that all necessary conditions for deployment be fulfilled in a timely manner by the Angolans themselves.

30. The stakes are high and the need to consolidate the peace process is urgent. At this critical stage, I wish to appeal once again to President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi to proceed with the necessary preparations for a meeting between them at the earliest possible opportunity. Such a meeting should provide a strong impetus to national reconciliation.

31. The improvement in security conditions has made new areas accessible to relief assistance and the civilian population. As demonstrated at the recent donors' meeting on Angola, the international community is willing to keep pace with increased demands for humanitarian assistance in order to promote peace and bolster the hopes of the Angolan people. It is essential, however, that the two parties demonstrate the highest degree of cooperation and refrain from all actions which may hamper the expansion of humanitarian activities in Angola.

Annex

UNAVEM III military and civilian police personnel

(as of 31 March 1995)

Country	Military observers	Civilian police officers	Military medical personnel	Staff officers	Total
Algeria	10				10
Argentina	2	3			5
Bangladesh	10				10
Brazil	19	15	11		45
Bulgaria	10	10			20
Congo	7				7
Egypt	10	10			20
Fiji		10			10
France	8				8
Guinea-Bissau	18	6			24
Hungary	10	15			25
India	20	19			39
Jordan	22	20			42
Kenya	10				10
Malaysia	20	20			40
Mali	10				10
Morocco		2			2
Netherlands	15	10			25
New Zealand	6				6
Nigeria	20	15			35
Norway	4				4
Pakistan	5				5
Poland	7				7
Portugal	6			1	7
Russian Federation	10				10

Country	Military observers	Civilian police officers	Military medical personnel	Staff officers	Total
Senegal	10				10
Slovakia	5				5
Sweden	18				18
Uruguay	10				10
Zambia	10	10			20
Zimbabwe	21	17			38
Total	333	182	11	1	527

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China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Convinced that every effort must be made to avoid and avert the danger of nuclear war, to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to facilitate international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with particular emphasis on the needs of developing countries, and reaffirming the crucial importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to these efforts,

Recognizing the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to receive security assurances,

Welcoming the fact that more than 170 States have become Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and stressing the desirability of universal adherence to it,

Reaffirming the need for all States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to comply fully with all their obligations,

Taking into consideration the legitimate concern of non-nuclear-weapon States that, in conjunction with their adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, further appropriate measures be undertaken to safeguard their security,

Considering that the present resolution constitutes a step in this direction,

Considering further that, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, any aggression with the use of nuclear weapons would endanger international peace and security,

1. Takes note with appreciation of the statements made by each of the nuclear-weapon States (S/1995/261, S/1995/262, S/1995/263, S/1995/264, S/1995/265), in which they give security assurances against the use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States that are Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

2. Recognizes the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to receive assurances that the Security Council, and above all its nuclear-weapon State permanent members, will act immediately in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, in the event that such States are the victim of an act of, or object of a threat of, aggression in which nuclear weapons are used;

3. Recognizes further that, in case of aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, any State may bring the matter immediately to the attention of the Security Council to enable the Council to take urgent action to provide assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to the State victim of an act of, or object of a threat of, such aggression; and recognizes also that the nuclear-weapon State permanent members of the Security Council will bring the matter immediately to the attention of the Council and seek Council action to provide, in accordance with the Charter, the necessary assistance to the State victim;

4. Notes the means available to it for assisting such a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, including an investigation into the situation and appropriate measures to settle the dispute and restore international peace and security;

5. Invites Member States, individually or collectively, if any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is a victim of an act of aggression with nuclear weapons, to take appropriate measures in response to a request from the victim for technical, medical, scientific or humanitarian assistance, and affirms its readiness to consider what measures are needed in this regard in the event of such an act of aggression;

6. Expresses its intention to recommend appropriate procedures, in response to any request from a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is the victim of such an act of aggression, regarding compensation under international law from the aggressor for loss, damage or injury sustained as a result of the aggression;

7. Welcomes the intention expressed by certain States that they will provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act of, or an object of a threat of, aggression in which nuclear weapons are used;

8. Urges all States, as provided for in Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to pursue negotiations in good faith on

effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control which remains a universal goal;

9. Reaffirms the inherent right, recognized under Article 51 of the Charter, of individual and collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security;

10. Underlines that the issues raised in this resolution remain of continuing concern to the Council.